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Abstract 
We analyze household income dynamics using longitudinal data from Indonesia, South Africa 
(KwaZulu-Natal), Spain and Venezuela. In all four countries, households with the lowest 
reported base-year income experienced the largest absolute income gains. This result is robust 
to reasonable amounts of measurement error in two of the countries. In three of the four 
countries, households with the lowest predicted base-year income experienced gains at least as 
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The fate of the world’s poor in today’s increasingly globalized world is a hotly-contested 
issue. Opponents of free trade argue that unfettered access to foreign capital, technology, 
and goods primarily benefits a well-connected and highly skilled elite, to the exclusion of 
the poor, voiceless majority. The anti-globalization crowd has literally thrown stones at 
those who assert that free trade and highly integrated markets are in the economic interest 
of the poor. In this paper, we use panel data from four countries to ask how initially poor 
households fared economically relative to their wealthier counterparts during the 1990’s. 
The more that economic growth benefited initially wealthy households to the exclusion of 
the initially poor, the greater the justification for policies that redistribute income to the 
poor, even at the expense of economic growth. 
A large literature uses cross-sectional regressions to analyze the determinants of 
economic growth at the country level (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1997; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000). However, these papers analyze the determinants of 
aggregate income rather than examining changes in the economic condition of 
households. 
When looking at changes in households’ incomes within countries, analysts typically 
consider changes in the anonymous income distribution from comparable cross sectional 
surveys or censuses. These studies compare one set of poor households in the base year to 
another set of poor households in the final year, but can say nothing about the income 
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changes of initially poor or rich households. To see how those with different initial 
positions in the income distribution have fared, longitudinal data are required. 
This work uses new panel data to analyze household income dynamics in four very 
different economies - Indonesia, South Africa, Spain, and Venezuela - during the 1990’s. 
We address two main questions: First, what is the relationship between households' 
reported base year income and their subsequent income change? Did households that 
reported a high level of income in the base year experience greater or lesser income 
gains, on average, than initially low-income households? Second, what is the relationship 
between households’ longer-term economic position in the base year and their subsequent 
income changes? Did households with high predicted income, based on their asset 
holdings, education levels, and other household characteristics, enjoy disproportionately 
large income gains? 
The remainder of this paper is laid out in five sections. Section II reviews theoretical 
foundations, the four panel surveys and the macroeconomic conditions they captured, and 
a number of methodological choices. Section III presents a detailed analysis of the 
relationship between base-year economic position and subsequent income change. 
Section IV examines how that relationship is influenced by the extent and properties of 
measurement error in income. Section V briefly examines relative mobility. Finally, 
Section VI summarizes the main conclusions, caveats, and directions for further research. 
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II. Theory and Methods 
A. Theoretical Foundations 
Various theories offer guidance on the forces influencing household income dynamics. 
One theory is cumulative advantage, which posits that households with higher predicted 
income in the base year experience the highest or most positive income changes. 
Wealthier households’ ownership of physical and human capital, access to social and 
political connections, and greater ability to borrow and save, could all contribute to 
cumulative advantage (Merton, 1968; Boudon, 1973; Huber, 1998). Complementing 
cumulative advantage is the notion of poverty traps: that households lacking a minimum 
level of human, physical, and social assets are consigned to a life in poverty. These 
processes generate what Nobel-Laureate James Meade (1976, p. 155) called “self-
reinforcing influences which help to sustain the good fortune of the fortunate and the bad 
fortune of the unfortunate.” 
A third factor that may contribute to cumulative advantage and poverty traps is labor 
market twist. This idea holds that in an increasingly globalized and technology-
dependent world, the demand for skills is outpacing the available supply, bidding up the 
earnings of skilled workers while lowering those of the unskilled. (Gottschalk, 1997; 
Johnson, 1997; Topel, 1997; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Friedman, 2000). Skill-biased 
technical change would act to propel households with the highest human and physical 
capital endowments ahead the most -- that is, a pattern where the households with the 
highest predicted income experience the largest gains. 
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An opposing set of theories posits that economic changes in these four countries would 
have favored the initially disadvantaged households, those endowed with relatively low 
levels of human and physical capital. The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework 
predicts that increased international trade raises the returns to relatively abundant factors 
of production. In Indonesia, South Africa, and Venezuela, this theory would predict that a 
period of increased trade would benefit households with relatively low levels of human 
and physical capital.6 
In addition to increased international trade, in two of the four countries studied, political 
and macroeconomic events may have favored initially poorer households. In South 
Africa, the end of Apartheid coincided with a change in the informal sector that brought 
increased employment and earnings to prime working-aged black South Africans 
(Cichello, Fields, Leibbrandt, 2001). In Venezuela, the burden of a recession caused 
largely by a fall in oil prices and political instability may have fallen disproportionately 
on middle-class and richer households. In these two countries in particular, political and 
macroeconomic conditions may have favored households with lower expected income. 
The theories of cumulative advantage, the effects of international trade, and 
macroeconomic and political conditions discussed so far bear on the relationship between 
a household’s longer-run economic position and its subsequent income changes. 
However, two additional sets of theories apply to the relationship between a household’s 
actual base year income and subsequent income changes. Transitory income shocks may 
6
 See Wood [1997] for a critique of the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model, particularly as applied 
to middle-income countries. 
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persist and build on themselves, since income windfalls or shortfalls can lead to the 
accumulation or loss of physical, financial, or social capital. In particular, in models in 
which household income is subject to at least one or more unstable equilibria, income 
shocks can lead a household on a path towards a new steady state income level. These 
multiple-equilibrium models are consistent with the notion of a poverty trap based on 
income: that households whose incomes fall below a certain level are trapped in poverty. 
(Nelson, 1956; Galbraith, 1979; Schultz, 1980; Dasgupta and Ray, 1986; Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993.) 
In contrast with theories predicting that income shocks persist, the permanent income 
hypothesis assumes that transitory income shocks are serially independent, which on 
average leads household incomes to regress to their expected level the following period 
(Friedman, 1957). A weaker version of the permanent income hypothesis allows for a 
partial correlation between successive transitory income shocks, which leads household 
incomes to gradually regress towards their mean. In either case, this theory implies that 
households with low reported incomes in the initial year are more likely to have 
experienced a negative transitory shock in the initial year, and their subsequent recovery 
therefore appears as a relatively large income gain. Thus, if transitory income shocks are 
less persistent than changes in longer-term income, transitory income shocks will 
contribute to a more negative relationship between reported base year income and income 
change. 
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Finally, measurement error is a serious concern when dealing with estimates of income 
drawn from household surveys, particularly in developing countries, where income from 
self-employment is notoriously difficult to measure. Measurement error in base year 
income typically produces a spurious negative association between reported base year 
income and measured income change. Therefore, measurement error may also be an 
important factor contributing to a negative relationship between reported initial income 
and income change. The influence of measurement error on our results is discussed in 
detail below. 
B. Data and Macroeconomic Conditions in the Four Countries 
This research is a comparative study of four countries: Indonesia, South Africa, Spain, 
and Venezuela. Publicly accessible panel surveys were undertaken in each country during 
the mid 1990s. Other than that, these countries have little in common, differing in both 
their base levels of economic development and their ongoing macroeconomic conditions. 
Together, the panel data sets present a unique chance to identify common patterns in the 
dynamics of household income across surveys that differ in terms of location, time 
period, and macroeconomic conditions. 
The Indonesian data come from the first and second rounds of the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey, a panel survey conducted jointly by the Rand Corporation and the Demographic 
Institute of the University of Indonesia. The first round of the survey interviewed 
approximately 7,200 households in 1993. These households lived in 320 communities, 
spanning 13 provinces, and were representative of 83% of the national population of 
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roughly two hundred million. Ninety-four percent of these households were re-
interviewed in 1997. This time period covers the final five years of an enduring trend of 
real GDP growth and stable economic management that characterized most of the 30-year 
Soeharto regime. Real GDP grew at about 7% per year from 1993 to 1997, raising per 
capita GDP from approximately $920 to $1130. Meanwhile, prices held steady, rising 
about 8% per year. The stunning collapse of the rupiah that led to massive economic 
dislocation and political chaos began in September 1997 and climaxed in January 1998. 
The second round of the IFLS was mostly conducted from August to November of 1997, 
largely before the adverse effects of the crisis were apparent.7 The data are described in 
more detail in Frankenberg and Thomas (2000). 
The South African data come from the 964 African households in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) panel data set.8 The 1993 South African Labour and 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU) national household survey provides information 
for the base period. A follow up 1998 survey was conducted in the KwaZulu-Natal 
region, which is home to roughly 20 percent of the South African population. The initial 
survey took place just months before the historic 1994 elections and transition of political 
7
 There are two other reasons why the Indonesian results do not capture the economic crisis. First, 
income is reported for the previous year. Second, initial evidence shows that nominal wages 
stayed relatively constant during the start of the crisis. The government’s inflation numbers jump 
in November and December, but that jump is still a small factor in the 1997 price index that was 
used to deflate incomes in this study. 
8
 "African" is a racial term in sub-Saharan Africa, denoting persons who are pure black. In local 
parlance, those of mixed blood are denoted "coloreds." The 964 households come from the 
October 2001 re-release of the KIDS data set. In October 2002, the authors learned that questions 
have been raised about the integrity of some of the responses in the existing version of the 
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study. At this time, the extent of the flaws has not been 
determined, and the data set has not been amended. Accordingly, the reader is warned that all 
analyses using the KIDS data, including the results reported here, are subject to revision at a later 
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power to Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress. Thus, this research enables 
us to analyze which African households got ahead by how much in the first years after 
Apartheid. The country’s macroeconomic performance in the time period was not stellar, 
with GDP averaging 2.7 % real growth per annum and with particularly low growth in 
1998. In contrast, income growth rate among African households in the panel sample 
used in this work was 5.0 % per annum. The data are described in more detail in May et 
al (2000). 
The data used for Spain come from the ECPF (Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos 
Familiares) or Spanish Household Panel Survey, from the years 1995 and 1996. It is a 
national quarterly rotating panel that follows households for a maximum of two years 
(after each quarter, 1/8 of the sample rotates). The target sample size each quarter rounds 
off to 3,200 households. A one-year panel of 1,233 households was constructed for this 
study, consisting of those households interviewed in the first quarter of 1996 and again in 
1997 where at least one member remained the same. The income variable used 
corresponds to household real monetary income of the previous three months. The 
Spanish economy grew during this period, as Real GDP expanding by 2.3%, per capita 
GDP increased from roughly $14,950 to $15,300, and the unemployment rate slightly 
diminished from 22.9% to 22.2%. 
The Venezuelan data come from the Sample Household Survey (Encuesta de Hogares por 
Muestreo) conducted by the Oficina Central de Estadística e Informática, Venezuela’s 
time. Finally, if a 1993 household split into multiple households, only the first household 
interviewed in 1998 is used in constructing change in household income. 
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government agency for the collection of statistics. Since 1997, it has been conducted in 
urban areas only; the urban population in Venezuela is 80.3% of the total. Households 
are followed for a maximum of six consecutive semesters. We matched households from 
the second semesters of 1997 and 1998 using a unique dwelling identification number 
and the condition that at least one member be the same in both periods. The resulting 
panel consists of a total of 7,521 households. The Venezuelan economy experienced a 
sharp macroeconomic decline between 1997 and 1998 due to the fall of oil prices and a 
highly contentious electoral process. Output growth fell from 5.9% in 1997 to -0.7% in 
1998, and per capita income fell from about $3610 to $3510. Inflation declined but 
remained high, going from 50% to 36%. Open unemployment grew from 10.7% to 11.3% 
and informal employment grew from 47.5% to 50.2%. 
C. Methodological Choices 
Our analysis of household income dynamics in the four countries rests on a number of 
methodological choices. The first was the unit of analysis. As a practical matter, our 
surveys contain substantial numbers of individuals who moved into and out of 
households. In general, our surveys did not track household members who moved, and 
thus their economic outcomes are unobserved. Therefore, we have chosen in this study to 
present a relatively accurate snapshot of the demographic and economic changes of 
households rather than an incomplete and biased picture of the changes experienced by 
individuals. 
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Our next fundamental decision was to investigate income dynamics rather than 
consumption dynamics. Some studies on economic dynamics in developing countries 
look at household consumption (Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Glewwe and Hall (1998) 
Grootaert, et al. (1997), Maluccio, Haddad, and May (2000)) while others use income 
(Gunning et al. (2000), Drèze, Lanjouw, and Stern (1992)). The use of consumption is 
often justified on the grounds that smoothing makes consumption a more accurate 
measure of longer-term welfare and that income, particularly self-employment income, is 
more difficult to measure. However, analyses of data from India and China do not find 
that consumption is clearly superior to income as an indicator of longer-term economic 
well-being (Chaudhuri and Ravallion, 1994; Naga and Burgess, 2001). More 
importantly, in this study data considerations alone necessitate the use of income, as not 
all of our surveys contain measures of household consumption.9 
Next, we had to decide how to adjust for household size. The literature has come to no 
consensus on the proper way to take account of household economies of scale. Therefore, 
we chose to report the simplest and most popular method, the per capita adjustment. 
The final issue was the choice of dependent variable. We have chosen to conduct our 
analyses using two different dependent variables: first, change in per capita income 
measured in currency units, and second, change in log per capita income (real in both 
cases). Analyzing changes in currency units (denoted PCI) is more traditional, and 
9
 The Spanish and Venezuelan data do not contain a consumption module. In addition, changes in 
the Indonesian non-food consumption module between 1993 and 1997 render consumption 
aggregates incomparable. 
11 
measures absolute income gains. For comparison purposes, results are also reported using 
changes in log per capita income ( log PCI), which approximates percentage income 
gains. Using changes in logs is consistent with the widespread belief in concave utility 
functions -- that a given increase in per capita income leads to a greater increase in the 
economic welfare of a poor household than that of a rich household. In all cases, incomes 
are measured in inflation-adjusted terms. 
III. Empirical Results. 
A. Trends in Inequality 
Some analysts believe that patterns of income dynamics are apparent from changes in 
cross-sectional income inequality but, as we shall show, this is not the case in our four 
countries. We begin by documenting the changes in the cross-sectional inequality among 
households that appear in both years of our panel surveys. In addition, in Spain and 
Venezuela, nationally representative samples can be used to calculate income inequality. 
Table 1 presents the Gini coefficient of inequality in the base and final years, for 
household income in both log per capita and per capita terms.10 Inequality showed little 
change or decreased in Indonesia and Venezuela, while inequality showed little change or 
increased in Spain and South Africa. 
Occasionally, rising income inequality is misinterpreted as evidence that economic 
conditions have worsened for the poor in an absolute sense. A more common error is to 
interpret rising income inequality as suggesting that, on average, the initially rich 
10
 In Table 1, we classify inequality as showing little change if the change in Gini coefficients was 
less than 0.01. 
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experienced more favorable income changes than the initially poor. Rising inequality 
indicates that the dispersion of income has widened, but contains no information on the 
movement of specific households within that distribution. If sufficient numbers of poor 
and rich households swap positions, the initially poor will gain more on average than the 
initially rich, even as the distribution of income grows more unequal. To investigate 
whether pro-poor income changes occurred in countries with rising cross-sectional 
income inequality, we now turn to analyzing changes in household income, measured 
directly. 
B. Univariate Regressions 
Do initially poorer households get ahead more or less than initially richer households? A 
number of previous studies have attempted to answer this question by estimating the 
extent to which household economic well-being converges towards the grand mean or 
diverges away from it. In these studies, the measure of economic position is household 
per capita expenditure, individual earnings, or its logarithm. The extent of convergence or 
divergence can be measured by regressing change in economic position (which we denote 
here by Y2-Y1) on base year economic position (Y1) with no other variables present. A 
slope less than zero has been found in studies of the United Kingdom (Creedy and Hart, 
1979; Thatcher, 1971), the United States (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995), and Côte 
d’Ivoire (Grootaert et al., 1997), indicating convergence in these cases.11 Convergence 
does not appear everywhere, however. In France, incomes were found to have converged 
11
 Many of these studies report the coefficient from a regression of final year income on initial 
year income, from which we subtract one to obtain the coefficient on income change. Also, 
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between 1963 and 1966 but incomes neither converged nor diverged between 1966 and 
1970 (Hart, 1976). In the United States, convergence was found for 1970-1975 and 1975-
1980, neither convergence nor divergence was found between 1980 and 1985, and 
incomes diverged from 1985 and1990 and from 1990 to 1995 (Fields, forthcoming). 
Taken at face value (i.e., without considering the possibility of measurement error), these 
studies show that household incomes in these countries sometimes converge towards the 
grand mean, sometimes diverge away from it, and sometimes do neither. 
Turning now to our four countries, the coefficients for regressions of this type are 
presented in the top half of Table 2. The first row demonstrates that households with 
lower reported incomes, measured in monetary terms, experienced more favorable 
income changes. The second row demonstrates an even stronger negative relationship 
between reported log income per capita and log income change in all four countries. 
The bottom two rows report results using predicted initial income as a measure of longer-
term economic position in the initial period. Initial income is predicted using household 
composition, educational and occupational status, physical assets, and local 
characteristics.12 Table 2 shows mixed results when changes are measured in currency 
units. A statistically significant negative relationship is found between predicted incomes 
Moffitt and Gottschalk provided variance and covariance terms for log earnings in various years 
from which the coefficient was calculated. 
12
 The set of variables used to predict income is listed in Table 4. Table 4 also provides evidence 
of the strong predictive power of these covariates. However, the resulting predictions cannot 
capture all sources of a household’s expected or permanent income. If initial permanent income 
omitted from the prediction has a systematically different effect on income change predicted 
income, estimates of the relationship between permanent income and income change will be 
biased accordingly. 
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and income change in Venezuela. However, the relationship between predicted income 
and income change in monetary units is insignificant in South Africa and Spain, and 
households with higher predicted incomes experienced significantly more favorable 
income changes in Indonesia. When measured in log units, however, in all four countries 
households with lower predicted log-income experienced the largest income gains. 
Overall, these results show a pronounced negative relationship between reported income 
and subsequent income change, and a negative relationship between predicted log income 
and income change. In only one case, Indonesia, is the relationship between predicted 
income and income change statistically significant and positive. So far, in these four 
countries, there is remarkably little evidence supporting the theory of cumulative 
advantage, which predicted that those households that started in the most favorable 
economic positions experienced the most favorable income changes. 
It is possible that allowing for non-linearity in the relationship between initial income and 
income change would cause a different pattern of income dynamics to emerge. The next 
subsections address these concerns, presenting profile analysis based on quintiles of 
initial economic well-being and non-parametric regressions in turn. 
C. Profile of Changes in PCI 
Tables 3.a and 3b relate changes in household per capita and log per capita income, 
respectively, to the quintiles of reported and predicted base year income. 13 In addition, 
Predicted initial income quintiles are the quintiles of households’ predicted income. 
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households’ longer-term economic positions in the base year are also gauged using the 
quintile of consumption, total value of assets, and housing rent when available. Quintiles 
are used to allow for the possibility of non-linear relationships. The upper portion of 
Table 3.a shows the relationship between the quintile of initial reported income and 
average income change. In Spain and Venezuela, the relationship is monotonically 
negative, and it is nearly so in South Africa. In Indonesia, though, income changes were 
essentially the same in the first four quintiles, but significantly lower for the richest 
quintile. Overall, the relationship between the quintile of reported initial income and 
average income change is statistically significant and negative, meaning that households 
that reported lower initial income experienced larger average gains. 
On the other hand, the measures of longer-term economic position shown in Table 3.a 
indicate a variety of patterns. In South Africa, we continue to find that those who started 
in the richest predicted income or consumption quintile got ahead the least. In Indonesia, 
on the other hand, the longer-term indicators (predicted income quintile, consumption 
quintile, asset quintile) all show the opposite pattern: those who got ahead the most in 
currency units were the ones who started ahead. In Spain and in Venezuela, these other 
indicators exhibit no statistically significant pattern. Thus, there is no clear cross-country 
pattern for the changes in currency units: we find divergence in Indonesia, convergence 
in South Africa, and no statistically significant pattern in Spain and Venezuela. 
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D. Profile of Changes in Log PCI 
Two further checks were performed to test the robustness of the conclusion of 
unconditional convergence. First, the analysis was redone taking as the dependent 
variable the change in per capita income measured in log units ( log PCI). These results 
appear in Table 3.b. In all four countries, the relationship between the quintile of reported 
income and log income change is strongly negative; those who reported higher base year 
incomes got ahead the least in percentage terms. Meanwhile, in Indonesia and South 
Africa, the relationships between all measures of longer-term measures of well-being and 
log income change are negative and statistically significant. There is no evidence in any 
of the four countries that those who started with a higher level of income, consumption, 
or assets experienced greater percentage income gains than others. 
E. Non-Parametric Regressions 
Non-parametric regressions give a more detailed view of the relationship between base 
year economic position and household income mobility. The plots in Figures 1.a-d are 
obtained by using a running line smoother, which locally estimates slopes between each 
point taking into account the nearest neighboring points.14 Analytic confidence intervals 
bracket the smoothed plot. Figures 1.a. and 1.b show the smoothed relationship between 
change in per capita income change and both initial reported income and initial predicted 
income. Figures 1.c and 1.d plot the smoothed relationships between log income change 
14
 The number of neighbors to include is determined point by point by an algorithm that uses 
cross-validation techniques to minimize mean squared error. Running line estimators are similar to 
Cleveland’s (1979) Lowess estimator; the difference is the lack of weighting kernel. For South 
Africa and Indonesia, graphs constructed using Lowess differed little. 
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and both the log of reported income and predicted log income. Quintile boundaries are 
marked by vertical lines. 
These non-parametric regressions generally confirm what we found in the profile analysis 
above, namely: 
1. The relationship between PCI and reported initial PCI is markedly negative in Spain 
and Venezuela, generally negative and nearly monotonic in South Africa, and 
negative only within the bottom and top quintiles in the case of Indonesia. 
2. Relating PCI to predicted PCI, the non-parametric analysis reveals a negative 
relationship in the top three quintiles in Venezuela and South Africa, hints at a 
positive relationship in Spain, and provides further evidence that the top quintile 
experienced relatively large gains in Indonesia. 
3. The relationship between log PCI and reported initial log PCI is markedly negative 
in all four countries. 
4. The relationship between log PCI and predicted log PCI is negative in South Africa 
and Indonesia, while confidence bands reveal that there is no clear statistically valid 
relationship in Venezuela and Spain. 
IV. Robustness to Measurement Error 
So far, we have reported results relating income change to reported and predicted base 
year income, which are approximations to actual income and longer-term income 
respectively. Unfortunately, household incomes are notoriously difficult to measure.. 
This section discusses how measurement error in our income data influences the results 
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reported above. How robust are the generally negative relationships between base year 
reported and predicted income and income change to the existence of measurement error? 
A. Measurement Error in Reported Income 
To analyze the effect of measurement error on the relationship between base year 
reported income and income change, the income reported by household i in year t is 
written as the sum of unobserved true income Yit * and a measurement error component 
juii t: 
Yit =Yit *+<ult. (1) 
Measurement error may be correlated with true income. A negative correlation arises if 
wealthier households are reluctant to report their full incomes, perhaps out of fear that the 
survey will be used for tax purposes, or if shame or embarrassment leads some poorer 
households to overstate their incomes. Following Bound et al (1994), measurement error 
in the initial period is taken to be a linear function of true income in the initial period, 
plus a white-noise disturbance term, u1. Letting Y1 * equal average true income in the 
initial period, and 81 represent the correlation between true base year income and 
measurement error, measurement error in base year reported income is written as: 
^=5^*-¥1* ) +ul1 . (2) 
In the second period, measurement error may not only be correlated with true income in 
that period but also with measurement error in the first period. Serial correlation in 
measurement error ait occurs if particular households systematically under or over-report 
their income; the serial correlation parameter is labeled p. Therefore, we assume that 
measurement error in the final period is correlated both with true income in the final 
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period and the idiosyncratic portion of the previous period’s measurement error in the 
following way: 
fii2=S2{Yi2*-Y2*)+pu1+ui2. (3) 
The relationship between households’ income in the initial period and their subsequent 
income change, when income is measured without error, is the coefficient from a 
regression of true income change on true initial income. This coefficient measures the 
extent of convergence or divergence in true incomes, measured without error, and can be 
expressed as: 
rov\v * _ F * v *1 
r* = L 2
 r 1 , 1
 J
. (4) 
Var\Y1 *] 
The OLS estimate from a regression of reported income change on reported base year 
income, reported in Table 2, is expressed as: 
ˆ = Cov[Y2-Y Y1\ 
Var\Y1] 
Substituting equations (1) through (4) into equation (5), as shown in appendix A, gives: 
r
 =
 r
^J{1 + S11 + S^- Var[Y1] +1^ (1 + ^ - . (6) 
Signing the components of bias requires two additional assumptions. First, a particular 
household’s propensity to misreport income is assumed to decline or remain constant 
over time, such that p<1. Second, measurement error is assumed partially correlated 
with true income, such that 5t>-1. Both of these assumptions are consistent with 
validation studies using U.S. data, as discussed further below. 
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Under these assumptions, the second term of equation (6) shows that measurement error 
in initial income contributes to an apparent negative correlation between base-year 
income and subsequent income change. This negative correlation occurs because the 
mismeasured estimate of initial income is also used to calculate income change. This 
bias, however, is lessened if measurement error exhibits serial correlation in 
measurement error. The first term of equation (6) captures the standard attenuation bias 
caused by the stochastic independent variable. This attenuation bias is exacerbated if 
measurement error is negatively correlated with true income in each period. If the true 
relationship between initial income and income change is negative, so that true incomes 
converged towards the grand mean, then this attenuation bias counteracts the effects of 
the second term by raising the value of the estimated coefficient towards zero. Finally, 
the third term will be relatively small, unless the strength of the correlation between 
measurement error and true income changed considerably between periods. 
The variance of reported income in the first period, which appears in the denominator of 
equation (6), is itself a function of the covariance between measurement error and true 
base year income. Substituting for the variance of reported income Y1, as described in 
Appendix A, leads to the following expression: 
Var[u1 ] = y *ffa,S2 ) + g (S1,S2 ) -r1 + fi12 (7) 
Var\Y1 *] 1-p + r 
Equation (7) gives the variance of stochastic measurement error, relative to the variance 
of true income, given the observed coefficient on reported income y and a particular 
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value of the unknown coefficient on true income, y*. Setting y* equal to zero gives the 
minimum amount of measurement error required to overturn the negative relationship 
between initial income and income change. Table 5a reports this minimum threshold, 
which is calculated for combinations of three different values of the p and 5 parameters 
(81 and 52 are assumed to be equal). In South Africa and Venezuela, for divergence to 
have taken place, the variance of measurement error would need to be at least 34 to 78 
percent of the variance of true incomes, depending on the correlation between 
measurement error and both true income and past measurement error. In Indonesia, 
measurement error with variance that ranges from 20 to 40 percent of true income could 
be entirely responsible for the observed estimates of convergence. Finally, in the Spanish 
data, if the variance of stochastic measurement error is over 10 percent of the variance of 
true income, higher-income households got ahead more. 
The nature and extent of measurement error in our data on household income cannot be 
determined without a valid observation on true household income. As a rough basis for 
comparison, two validation studies of U.S. earnings data compared the Current 
Population Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to Social Security or firm 
records (Krueger and Bound, 1991, Bound et al 1994). These two studies found the 
following three regularities: First, the ratio of the variance of measurement error to true 
variance in true log annual earnings, Varf^ ranged from 7 to 25 percent. Second, 
Var\Yt *\ 
measurement error was negatively correlated with true log earnings and this correlation, 
which we call 5t, was between -0.15 and -0.03. Finally, measurement error exhibited 
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serial correlation, ρ, that ranged from 0.10 to 0.15. The level of measurement error in 
annual earnings data in the CPS or PSID is liable to be an imprecise approximation of 
measurement error in our data, which applies to the income of households, from outside 
the U.S., expressed in levels rather than logs. Nonetheless, a level of stochastic 
measurement error equal to ten percent of true income in our counties seems a credible 
lower bound. Thus, given the sensitivity of the Spanish results to measurement error, it is 
quite likely that higher income households in Spain experienced larger average income 
gains than lower income households did. Meanwhile, in the Indonesian data, a 
moderately high amount of measurement error would imply that high-income households 
got ahead more. In South Africa and Venezuela, however, we are more confident that 
measurement error is not so high as to overturn the conclusion that low-income 
households experienced the largest gains. 
B. Measurement Error in Predicted Income 
In the model above, measurement error in reported incomes is correlated with household 
characteristics that determine income, and is therefore present in predicted income. 
Predicted income is thus an imperfect indicator of true longer-term income, a latent 
variable defined as income predicted using true initial income, measured without error, as 
the dependent variable. In addition, true longer-term income is likely to be correlated 
with non-classical measurement error in reported income. For both of these reasons, the 
presence of non-classical measurement error, both in predicted base year income and in 
reported incomes, influences the estimated relationship between longer-term income and 
income change. 
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Appendix A describes a model in which the extent of the bias in this relationship 
primarily depends on two factors: the correlation between measurement error and true 
longer-term income, and the relationship between true initial income and income change. 
Table 5b presents the coefficient from a hypothetical regression of true income change on 
true longer-term income, for a range of negative correlations between measurement error 
and true longer-term income. In all simulations, Indonesian households with higher 
predicted income experienced the highest income gains, while in Spain, predicted income 
is essentially unrelated to income change. Meanwhile, in South Africa and Venezuela, 
households with the lowest longer-term income experienced the largest income gains. 
Therefore, we conclude that the qualitative relationships between predicted income and 
income change are unaffected by a sizeable amount of measurement error. 
C. Summary 
In Spain and Indonesia, the negative relationship between reported income and income 
change is not robust to measurement error. Simulations of the effect of measurement 
error, under reasonable values of parameters, indicate that in Spain, initial income and 
income change are positively related if the variance of measurement error is one tenth of 
the variance of true income. In the Indonesian data, if the variance of a stochastic 
measurement error component in income equals 20 to 40 percent of the variance of true 
income, the relationship between true initial income and true income change is positive. 
Finally, in South Africa and Venezuela, a positive relationship requires that the variance 
of measurement error equal 34 to 78 percent of the variance of true income . We 
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therefore conclude that true income probably did not converge in Spain, may not have 
converged in Indonesia, and likely converged in South Africa and Venezuela. 
Measurement error in income may also affect the relationship between predicted income 
and income change. In this case, however, the effect of measurement error is relatively 
minor, and the main conclusions are robust. 
V. Relative Mobility 
All of the analysis thus far has been in terms of changes in real currency units or their 
logarithms. In this section, we supplement the absolute mobility analysis with a look at 
relative mobility. Relative mobility is gauged by assessing which decile or centile of the 
per capita income distribution the household was in in the base year and in the final year. 
It is customary in mobility studies to present a decile transition matrix; these appear for 
our four countries in Table 6. In all of them, the largest entries are in the (10, 10) cell, 
followed by the (1, 1) cell. That is, the richest and the poorest households are the ones 
that are most likely to stay in the same income decile. The greatest positional movement 
is found in the middle income deciles. This is a standard pattern throughout the world 
(Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson, 1992; Fields, 2001). 
In addition, we have also calculated the mean number of centiles changed for households 
in each of the ten base-year income quintiles. As shown in Table 7, in all four countries, 
the relationship is clearly an inverse one. That is, on average, those households who 
started in the lowest positions moved up while those who started in the highest positions 
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moved down. Of course, 10% of the households must always be in each income decile, so 
whenever some household moves up in the relative distribution, some other household 
must move down. Moreover, households in the lowest income deciles have little or no 
room to move downward, and likewise those in the top deciles have little or no room to 
move upward. For these reasons, the negative relationship between initial income decile 
and mean centile change could hardly have come out otherwise. 
By contrast, the absolute mobility changes calculated above could have come out 
otherwise but for the most part did not. For this reason, we give much more weight to the 
earlier results than to the relative mobility findings of this section. 
VI. Conclusions 
For many people, judgments regarding economic changes in the 1990’s depend critically 
on the extent to which initially poor households improved their economic well-being 
relative to their richer counterparts. This paper examined change in per capita household 
income, in both logarithmic and monetary terms, in four very diverse economies: 
Indonesia, South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal), Spain, and Venezuela. Despite differences in 
types of data, years of observation, macroeconomic conditions, and income levels, strong 
patterns emerged. 
The first question was whether households that reported higher base year incomes gained 
more or less than households that reported low base year incomes. In other words, did 
reported incomes converge towards or diverge away from the grand mean? Overall, both 
linear and non-linear techniques show that in all four countries, households that reported 
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the lowest base year incomes enjoyed the most favorable income changes. The pattern of 
convergence in reported income was even stronger when incomes were measured in log 
terms. We therefore draw a qualified conclusion: before taking account of measurement 
error, in all four countries, the combined effects of economic and political changes 
favoring poor households, recovery from transitory income shocks, and measurement 
error in income outweighed the combined effects of cumulative advantage and poverty 
traps. 
To what extent is the conclusion that reported incomes converged driven by measurement 
error in income? Without a validation study, measurement error in initial incomes cannot 
be distinguished from legitimate transitory income shocks, meaning that any assessment 
of the relationship between transitory income shocks and income change necessarily 
includes the effect of measurement error as well. If measurement error in household 
income in our four countries is as large as prevailing estimates for earnings data on U.S. 
males, our results suggest the following. In Spain, true incomes did not converge 
towards the grand mean. In Indonesia, under reasonable assumptions regarding the 
properties and extent of measurement error, it is difficult to tell whether true incomes 
converged. However, in South Africa and Venezuela, the conclusion of income 
convergence is quite robust to measurement error. 
The second question addressed in this study was whether households with higher 
permanent or longer-term income experienced higher income gains than households with 
lower permanent income. Longer-term income was approximated by predicting 
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household income, based on the household’s demographic characteristics, ownership of 
physical assets, and the age, education, and occupation of the head. In three of the four 
countries, households with lower predicted income experienced income gains at least as 
large as households with higher predicted income. The one exception was Indonesia, 
where households with low predicted income had above-average percentage gains in 
income but below-average gains in income measured in currency units. These results are 
robust with respect to reasonable amounts of measurement error in income. Unless 
measurement error is in fact larger than we have reason to believe it is, the results suggest 
that in South Africa, Spain, and Venezuela, the total effects of cumulative advantage 
based on wealth or connections, asset-based poverty traps, and labor market twist were 
more than offset by structural economic changes that favored poorer households. 
Looking ahead, we see several priorities for future work. Are the relatively large income 
gains of the initially poor permanent or temporary? Panel data with at least three 
observations would be needed to quantify the extent to which transient income 
fluctuations account for the largely progressive pattern of income changes that we 
observe. In addition, further work could document how the relationship between initial 
income and subsequent income change varies according to households’ observed 
characteristics. Finally, we would like to know how the characteristics of countries and 
their economies influence the extent to which income changes favor poor households. 
Longitudinal data from additional countries would be required to answer this important 
question convincingly, and we hope that the methods developed in this study will be 
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applied to other economies. Establishing the stylized facts on income dynamics in a wide 
range of countries and time periods still lies ahead. 
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Appendix A: Bias due to measurement error 
Equations (l)-(5) define the model of measurement error. From those definitions 
(i subscripts omitted for convenience), it follows that: 
(A.l) AY = Y2 *(l + S2) + (p-l)ul + u2 - 7 , *(l + 8l), 
where AY = (Y2-Yi). The following equation relates final year true income to initial year 
true income: 
(A.2) Y2* = (y*+l)Yl*+s, 
where s is a classical error term. From (A.1) and (A.2), it follows that: 
(A.3) Cov [AY, (l + 8, ) Y, * ] = (l + 5, Xl + 52 \y * +l) Var [ Yl * ] - (l + 5, f Var^, * ] , 
and: 
(A.4) Cov[AY,ux]=(p-\)Var\ux]. 
Therefore: 
(A.5) CovlAT^Y^Varfc ^ ( l + S^l + gJ+Varfc *](l + ^ 2 - ^ + ( ^ - 1 ^ 4 , ] , 
from which equation (6) in the text follows directly. Next, rewrite (5) as: 
(A.6) Cov[AY, Y1 ] = Var\Yx \y, 
and use equation (2) to obtain 
(A.7) Varfc ] = Varfo *\l + Sj + Var[Ul ]. 
Substituting (A.7) into (A.6), using (A.5), and rearranging, yields: 
(A.8) Var[uJy + l-p) = Var[Y1*ir*f(51,52) + g(51,52)-y(l + 51)2), 
where f(S,,S2) = (l + Sl\l + S2), 
and g(S1,S2) = (l + S1\S2-S1). 
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Equation (7) in the text follows directly. 
Non-classical measurement error is correlated to household characteristics used to predict 
income, and will therefore be present in predicted income. To account for this possibility, 
we define a latent variable 7ˆ1 * as predicted income in the absence of measurement error, 
which we call a household’s true longer-term income. Let 53 represent the correlation 
between true longer-term income and the measurement error component of predicted 
income. u3 represents additional noise in the prediction due to the stochastic component 
of measurement error u1. Predicted income is modeled as a linear function of true longer-
term income plus a disturbance term: 
(A.9) Yˆ1 = (1 + S3)f1*+u3. 
True predicted income is assumed to be an unbiased estimate of a household’s actual 
income. 
(A.10) Y1* = Y1*+u4. 
The coefficient of interest is the relationship between true predicted income and true 
income change, defined as: 
(A.11) ^2 —Tˆ ˆ1 
Var^i *\ 
Table 2 reports the coefficient from a regression of observed income change on predicted 
income: 
ˆ Cov^Yj] 
(A.12) y2 = L r ˆ I J , 
Var^\ 
which can be rewritten: 
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(A.13) Varfcfc = Varfr *](l + £3)[x2 *+/*(£,r*)], where 
h{S,y*) = S2y*+S2-S,. 
Taking the variance of equation (A.9) gives 
(A.14) Varfr]=(l + SjVarfr*] + Var[«3]. 
Substituting (A.14) into (A.13), after rearranging, yields: 
(A.15) y2 Yz (£,+!) + 
Var[u3] 
Var 
varm3 h(s,r*). 
For the purposes of simulation, we assume that 5i=52=53, that Var[u3] is negligible, and 
that the estimated coefficients using reported base year income, y, is equal to y * . 
Equation (A.15), under these assumptions, provides the coefficients y2 * that appear in 
Table 5b. 
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Table 1.a Cross-Sectional Evidence on Change in Inequality: Gini Coefficients for Household Log Per Capita Income 
Panel Households Only 
Nationally 
Representative Sample 
Conclusion 
INDONESIA 
1993 1997 
.207 .170 
* * 
Decreased inequality 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1993 1998 
.119 .120 
* * 
Little Change 
1995 
.337 
.311 
SPAIN 
Increased 
1996 
.339 
.328 
inequality 
VENEZUELA 
1997 1998 
.048 .049 
.051 .049 
Little change 
Table 1.b Cross-sectional changes in Inequality: Gini Coefficients for Household Per Capita Income 
Panel Households Only 
Nationally 
Representative Sample 
INDONESIA 
1993 
.559 
* 
1997 
.555 
* 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1993 
.515 
* 
1998 
.543 
* 
1995 
.319 
.320 
SPAIN 
1996 
.321 
.317 
VENEZUELA 
1997 1998 
.458 .459 
.487 .473 
Conclusion Decreased Inequality Increased inequality Little change Decrease 
* Representative samples for Indonesia and South Africa are not available in the final year. 
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Table 2: Coefficients from a Regression of Income Change on Base Year Income 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Change in PCI 
Change in log 
PCI 
Change in PCI 
Change in log 
PCI 
BASE 
YEAR 
INCOME 
Reported 
income 
Reported 
log income 
Predicted 
income 
Predicted 
log income 
INDONESIA 
-0.23* 
-0.53* 
0.14* 
-0.27* 
Pro-Poor 
Pro-Poor 
Pro-Rich 
Pro-poor 
SOUTH AFRICA 
-0.35* 
-0.56* 
-0.13 
-0.32* 
Pro-Poor 
Pro-Poor 
Insignificant 
Pro-Poor 
SPAIN 
-0.07* 
-0.52* 
0.01 
-0.13* 
Pro-Poor 
Pro-Poor 
Insignificant 
Pro-Poor 
VENEZUELA 
-0.35* 
-0.64* 
-0.37* 
-0.21* 
Pro-Poor 
Pro-Poor 
Pro-Poor 
Pro-Poor 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
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Table 3a: Mobility Profiles by Initial Position: Mean Changes in PCI 
INDONESIA 
Mean 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
Income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial * 
Consumption quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial * 
Asset quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
17.8 
26.8 
22.6 
21.9 
18.1 
-0.2 
14.2 
15.3 
15.2 
19.0 
29.3 
10.4 
17.3 
17.2 
21.2 
26.1 
18.6 
12.6 
12.2 
18.8 
29.3 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.3 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
2.2 
4.0 
1.0 
1.8 
2.0 
2.8 
4.3 
1.2 
1.6 
1.9 
2.3 
4.3 
1.7 
1.7 
1.9 
2.5 
3.4 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
Income quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial * 
Consumption quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
Mean 
46.5 
140.9 
73.6 
85.3 
33.8 
-101.7 
32.0 
82.0 
65.6 
41.4 
11.7 
66.7 
40.7 
74.0 
90.9 
-34.1 
Std. 
Dev. 
13.7 
23.0 
15.8 
21.3 
26.3 
38.0 
10.1 
27.9 
20.7 
24.9 
35.3 
15.3 
15.2 
21.3 
28.3 
30.5 
SPAIN 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
income quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial 
Consumption quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial 
Housing rent quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
Mean 
9.2 
21.0 
11.5 
9.9 
7.1 
-2.6 
6.0 
9.1 
11.8 
9.2 
11.1 
9.2 
2.3 
10.2 
12.2 
13.5 
7.4 
8.8 
9.0 
6.4 
15.5 
Std. 
Dev. 
48.4 
2.4 
2.4 
2.8 
3.5 
4.1 
2.5 
2.3 
3.1 
3.2 
3.6 
2.7 
2.4 
3.1 
3.8 
4.2 
2.6 
2.6 
2.7 
3.4 
4.0 
VENEZUELA 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
income quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
Mean 
2.2 
20.7 
13.4 
8.2 
-0.5 
-31.8 
4.5 
4.0 
3.1 
0.1 
0.2 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.9 
1.2 
1.0 
1.3 
1.5 
2.9 
1.0 
1.1 
1.3 
1.7 
2.8 
* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level using an F-test on category variables 
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Table 3b: Mobility Profiles by Initial Position: Mean Changes in Log PCI 
INDONESIA 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
income quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial 
Consumption quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial 
Asset quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
Mean 
0.38 
* 
1.53 
0.43 
0.17 
-0.02 
-0.22 
* 
0.75 
0.38 
0.27 
0.20 
0.16 
* 
0.49 
0.47 
0.37 
0.29 
0.22 
* 
0.53 
0.40 
0.30 
0.37 
0.28 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.02 
0.08 
0.05 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.06 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.04 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.04 
0.04 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
Income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial * 
Consumption quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
Mean 
0.15 
1.10 
0.23 
0.08 
-0.19 
-0.46 
0.51 
0.23 
0.18 
0.02 
-0.18 
0.47 
0.20 
0.20 
0.14 
-0.23 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.05 
0.14 
0.08 
0.09 
0.10 
0.07 
0.13 
0.09 
0.09 
0.10 
0.07 
0.11 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.07 
SPAIN 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
income quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial 
Consumption quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By initial 
Housing rent quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
Mean 
0.076 
0.27 
0.06 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.04 
0.05 
0.01 
0.06 
0.14 
0.06 
0.02 
0.06 
0.04 
0.14 
0.06 
0.07 
-0.01 
0.05 
0.14 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.05 
0.17 
0.02 
0.05 
0.02 
0.01 
0.08 
0.07 
0.08 
0.03 
0.09 
0.16 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.09 
0.02 
0.07 
0.03 
0.10 
VENEZUELA 
Total population 
By reported initial 
income quintile * 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
By fitted initial 
income quintile 
Poorest Quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
Richest quintile 
Mean 
-0.043 
1.150 
-0.150 
-0.461 
-0.335 
-0.408 
0.065 
-0.188 
-0.021 
-0.030 
-0.041 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.036 
0.118 
0.060 
0.075 
0.049 
0.027 
0.075 
0.090 
0.078 
0.059 
0.065 
* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level using an F-test on category variables 
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Table 4: Prediction of Base Year Per Capital Income and log Per Capita Income 
Common Prediction 
Variables 
Additional Prediction 
Variables 
R2 from OLS regression on 
initial PCI 
F statistic on all variables 
R2 from OLS regression on 
initial log PCI 
F statistic on all variables 
INDONESIA SOUTH AFRICA SPAIN VENEZUELA 
Region, head’s age, head’s schooling, number of children, head’s gender, family type, head’s employment 
{Value of Assets, type of 
floor and toilet facilities, 
number of household 
earners, cluster-average 
income per capita} 
0.364 
29.36 
0.396 
50.37 
{cluster average income 
per capita, presence of 
household durables} 
0.483 
27.95 
0.510 
25.60 
{Housing rent value, 
detailed family type (with 
or without children, with 
one or two or more adults, 
other types)} 
0.329 
20.29 
0.145 
21.02 
{Household durables 
(i.e. refrigerator, TV, 
stove, number of 
automobiles, etc.)} 
0.354 
84.94 
0.337 
78.75 
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Table 5a: Ratio of measurement error variance to true income variance implying zero correlation between true initial 
income and true income change. 
Correlation 
with true 
income δ1, δ2. 
0 
0 
0 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 
Serial 
Correlation ρ 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
INDONESIA 
0.30 
0.34 
0.40 
0.24 
0.28 
0.33 
0.19 
0.22 
0.26 
SOUTH AFRICA 
0.54 
0.64 
0.78 
0.44 
0.52 
0.63 
0.34 
0.41 
0.50 
SPAIN 
0.08 
0.08 
0.10 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
VENEZUELA 
0.54 
0.64 
0.78 
0.44 
0.52 
0.63 
0.34 
0.41 
0.50 
Table 5b: Coefficient from hypothetical regression of true income change on permanent income, by measurement error 
parameters. 
Correlation with true 
income δ1, δ2, δ3. 
0 
-0.05 
-0.1 
-0.15 
-0.2 
-0.25 
INDONESIA 
0.14 
0.12 
0.10 
0.08 
0.07 
0.05 
SOUTH AFRICA 
-0.13 
-0.14 
-0.15 
-0.16 
-0.17 
-0.19 
SPAIN 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
-0.00 
-0.01 
-0.00 
VENEZUELA 
-0.37 
-0.37 
-0.37 
-0.37 
-0.37 
-0.37 
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Table 6: Decile transition matrices. 
Indonesia: Per Capita Income Transition Matrix 
Percent of sample in 1997 log PCI decile, conditional on 1993 log PCI decile 
1993 \ 1997 
Lowest decile 
2nd decile 
3rd decile 
4th decile 
5th decile 
6th decile 
7th decile 
8th decile 
9th decile 
Highest decile 
1 
27.0 
22.4 
16.3 
13.9 
8.4 
8.5 
5.7 
5.0 
2.5 
2.5 
2 
19.8 
22.6 
15.8 
10.6 
9.8 
7.2 
9.6 
4.5 
3.4 
0.6 
3 
14.7 
17.0 
16.4 
14.3 
13.7 
7.9 
7.1 
6.6 
3.8 
2.5 
4 
13.4 
10.3 
16.7 
15.3 
14.2 
11.6 
8.2 
6.1 
4.1 
1.4 
5 
7.6 
7.1 
10.7 
13.8 
14.3 
15.9 
10.7 
8.5 
8.6 
3.8 
6 
7.3 
8.0 
8.4 
10.2 
14.5 
13.4 
12.1 
13.3 
7.1 
3.9 
7 
3.6 
5.8 
8.2 
10.3 
9.9 
13.8 
17.3 
13.0 
9.0 
6.4 
8 
2.9 
4.3 
4.3 
6.2 
8.5 
9.4 
14.0 
14.9 
17.9 
12.8 
9 
3.0 
1.6 
2.0 
4.1 
3.7 
7.6 
10.2 
16.9 
21.6 
23.4 
10 
0.8 
0.9 
1.3 
1.3 
3.2 
4.7 
5.3 
11.2 
22.1 
42.6 
South Africa: Per Capita Income Transition Matrix 
Percent of sample in 1998 log PCI decile, conditional on 1993 log PCI decile 
1993 \ 1998 
Lowest decile 
2nd decile 
3rd decile 
4th decile 
5th decile 
6th decile 
7th decile 
8th decile 
9th decile 
Highest decile 
1 
20.7 
14.7 
13.4 
11 
12.1 
7.3 
9.8 
5 
4.9 
2.4 
2 
19.5 
23.2 
11 
8.5 
9.6 
4.9 
6.1 
6.2 
6.1 
4.9 
3 
17.1 
17.1 
14.6 
18.3 
10.9 
3.7 
4.9 
6.2 
3.7 
3.7 
4 
12.2 
8.5 
9.8 
13.4 
18.1 
18.3 
9.8 
3.7 
4.9 
1.2 
5 
8.6 
15.8 
12.2 
11 
12 
4.9 
9.8 
11.1 
7.3 
7.3 
6 
7.3 
4.9 
11 
9.8 
8.4 
22 
11 
11.1 
7.3 
7.3 
7 
8.5 
8.5 
7.3 
12.2 
9.6 
15.8 
13.4 
11.1 
8.5 
4.9 
8 
1.2 
3.7 
9.7 
9.7 
9.6 
11 
14.6 
13.6 
14.6 
12.2 
9 
4.9 
0 
8.5 
2.4 
7.2 
7.3 
12.2 
19.8 
19.5 
18.3 
10 
0 
3.7 
2.4 
3.7 
2.4 
4.9 
8.5 
12.4 
23.2 
37.8 
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Table 6: Decile transition matrices (cont.). 
Spain: Per Capita Income Transition Matrix 
Percent of sample in 1996 log PCI decile, conditional on 1995 log PCI decile 
1995 \ 1996 
Lowest decile 
2nd decile 
3rd decile 
4th decile 
5th decile 
6th decile 
7th decile 
8th decile 
9th decile 
Highest decile 
1 
60.5 
25.2 
4.0 
5.2 
1.5 
2.3 
2.0 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2 
19.6 
42.9 
19.4 
12.0 
2.9 
0.9 
1.0 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
3 
8.8 
9.9 
39.9 
24.9 
7.6 
4.3 
1.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4 
3.4 
10.5 
15.7 
33.2 
28.0 
3.9 
6.3 
2.2 
0.2 
0.0 
5 
0.0 
3.6 
13.4 
9.9 
30.7 
27.6 
7.6 
5.0 
0.0 
0.4 
6 
4.3 
3.1 
1.2 
4.5 
12.9 
34.7 
26.4 
7.2 
4.3 
0.7 
7 
1.5 
1.5 
5.3 
6.1 
6.1 
10.0 
35.2 
20.3 
9.3 
1.2 
8 
0.7 
1.0 
1.2 
1.9 
5.9 
10.5 
11.6 
39.4 
27.5 
2.5 
9 
0.6 
1.3 
0.0 
1.8 
2.4 
5.1 
7.3 
18.0 
42.3 
23.9 
10 
0.6 
1.1 
0.0 
0.6 
2.0 
0.7 
1.6 
6.1 
16.5 
71.4 
Venezuela: Per Capita Income Transition Matrix 
Percent of sample in 1998 log PCI decile, conditional on 1997 log PCI decile 
1997 \ 1998 
Lowest decile 
2nd decile 
3rd decile 
4th decile 
5th decile 
6th decile 
7th decile 
8th decile 
9th decile 
Highest decile 
1 
34.2 
19.3 
12.4 
8.2 
6.3 
5.6 
4.3 
4.9 
2.4 
1.3 
2 
14.0 
22.7 
14.4 
12.6 
9.0 
7.2 
5.1 
3.9 
3.8 
2.2 
3 
12.6 
16.6 
17.3 
15.1 
11.4 
7.3 
8.8 
5.1 
2.6 
2.5 
4 
8.4 
13.7 
18.0 
15.8 
16.6 
10.5 
6.2 
6.3 
4.3 
3.1 
5 
8.9 
7.6 
11.3 
16.3 
13.9 
14.1 
11.8 
7.8 
5.9 
2.7 
6 
7.1 
6.9 
9.0 
10.4 
13.4 
16.6 
11.4 
11.9 
9.5 
4.8 
7 
6.9 
4.9 
8.8 
7.6 
12.3 
12.4 
14.4 
14.3 
13.5 
7.2 
8 
4.2 
4.7 
3.1 
6.2 
7.7 
12.7 
17.4 
18.7 
14.9 
9.6 
9 
3.3 
2.3 
3.8 
5.1 
5.7 
9.4 
14.7 
15.8 
22.8 
18.2 
10 
0.5 
1.3 
2.1 
2.8 
3.9 
4.2 
6.0 
11.5 
20.2 
48.3 
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Table 7: Average centile change, by initial income decile. 
By Initial Income Decile 
Lowest decile 
2nd decile 
3rd decile 
4th decile 
5th decile 
6th decile 
7th decile 
8th decile 
9th decile 
Highest decile 
INDONESIA 
Mean Centile 
Change 
+22.9 
+15.2 
+9.3 
+1.6 
+0.4 
-7.8 
-12.8 
-14.4 
-15.1 
-15.2 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.8 
1.1 
1.4 
1.1 
1.3 
1.4 
1.2 
1.5 
1.3 
1.1 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Mean Centile 
Change 
+30.6 
+20.7 
+9.7 
+6.8 
+0.2 
-3.6 
-14.8 
-14.4 
-18.3 
-17.3 
Std. 
Dev. 
3.5 
3.8 
2.8 
3.0 
3.6 
3.3 
3.5 
3.2 
3.1 
3.0 
SPAIN 
Mean Centile 
Change 
+9.8 
+5.0 
+4.3 
0.0 
0.6 
-2.1 
-5.0 
-5.0 
-4.4 
-3.2 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.7 
1.5 
1.3 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.3 
0.9 
0.7 
VENEZUELA 
Mean Centile 
Change 
+20.4 
+17.2 
+10.9 
+4.3 
-0.3 
-4.5 
-9.7 
-13.7 
-16.7 
-13.7 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.1 
1.1 
0.9 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
1.0 
1.1 
1.0 
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Figure 1.a: Non-parametric regression for change in PCI on initial PCI 
(extreme outlier data not shown, vertical lines indicate quintiles) 
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Figure 1.b: Non-parametric regression for change in PCI on predicted initial PCI 
(extreme outlier data not shown, vertical lines indicate quintiles) 
Indonesia, 1993-1998 South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal), 1993-1997 
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Figure 1.c: Non-parametric regression of change in log PCI on initial log PCI 
(extreme outlier data not shown, vertical lines indicate quintiles) 
Indonesia, 1993-1998 South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal), 1993-1997 
Mean Change in log PCI 95% conf. int 
Mean Chan in Log PCI 95% conf. int 
4 -
3 -
2 -
0 -
-1 -
-2 -
\ 
^ % ^ 
2 
1993 log PCI 
2 -
1.5 -
.5 -
0 -
-.5 -
-1 -
^ 
; ^ 
4 5 
1993 Log PCI 
1.17467 
-.576417 
Venezuela, 1996-1997 
estimated mean zero 95% conf. int 
8.1092 
Initial log PCI 
12.0423 
3 6 7 
-2 4 6 
.5 -
0 
48 
Figure 1.d: Non-parametric regression for change in log PCI on predicted log PCI 
(extreme outlier data not shown, vertical lines indicate quintiles) 
Indonesia, 1993-1998 South Africa (Kwazulu-Natal), 1993-1997 
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